Amnesty period extended due to the Supreme Court of Canada process

[u/SpectreBallistics]

https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2026/06/firearms-compensation-program-for-businesses-closes--amnesty-period-extended-due-to-the-supreme-court-of-canada-process.html

[u/CalibreMag]

IANL, but having read the original committee debate around 117.15 (2) when C-68 was introduced, it would not surprise me in the least if the Chief Justice sees this case as an opportunity to make their mark, for a few reasons: the fact that legislative counsel had
"grave concerns" about the inclusion of a subjective test rendering a privative clause, the fact that the committee actually voted to amend the section to remove the entire portion about the "governor in council's opinion" and return to the pre-existing objective wording that allowed for judicial review (an amendment that was then rejected by the House), and because it's hard to square both Allan Rock's testimony about the intent of that section as well as how it was addressed during clause-by-clause with how it was used by the Trudeau government - especially given many of the models banned were available in 1995, especially given the justification provided for amending the wording away from "reasonable for" in favour of "in the GiC's opinion," and especially because one of the banned guns in particular (the AR-15) had it's prohibition in '95 overturned specifically because it was determined to have legitimate sporting purpose.

They're good reads for anyone interested:

https://www.ourcommons.ca/Archives/committee/351/jula/evidence/147_95-05-19/jula147_blk-e.html

https://www.ourcommons.ca/Archives/committee/351/jula/evidence/157_95-06-05/jula157_blk-e.html

Simply put, it's hard not to read through the original transcripts and see how the SCC might not go, "yeah, sorry government, but there's no way you can do what you did while also interpreting 117.15 (2) as it was intended."

[u/JTrudeausLeftNut → u/CalibreMag]

Hansard is good evidence but is not definitive when interpreting statutes.

The courts will often looks to the plain and ordinary meaning of the text. Hansard can help interpret the meaning but other evidence can be admitted.

[u/CalibreMag → u/JTrudeausLeftNut]

True. It isn't definitive, but it is relevant.

And given the SCC's comments in its decision on the Telus case last year, it's easy to see how they might have been also drawn to give leave to this case:

"In accordance with the modern approach to statutory interpretation, the meaning of a statutory provision is determined by reference to its text, context and purpose. Statutory interpretation is centered on the intent of the legislature at the time of enactment and courts are bound to give effect to that intent. This principle does not, however, prevent courts from applying statutes to new or evolving circumstances. Legislatures frequently use broad or open‑textured language to cover circumstances that are neither in existence nor in their contemplation, in order to ensure the long‑term objects of an enactment without constantly reopening the statute. Properly understood, there is no contradiction between the principles that the interpretative exercise is grounded in the intent of the enacting legislature and that statutes can be applied to circumstances that were not contemplated by the legislature. Dynamic interpretation is situated firmly within the modern approach. There is no bright line between statutes that are static and statutes that are dynamic. The degree to which a provision is capable of applying to new circumstances, including new technology, is an interpretive question that must be answered by reading the text and context consistent with the legislature’s purpose."

Objectively, examining 117.15 thusly does pose an academically fascinating question, to say nothing of the importance of a finding.